

[REDACTED]  
SECURITY INFORMATION

IAC LIST OF INTELLIGENCE WEAKNESSES REVEALED IN THE PREPARATION  
OF NIE-35/1  
(in order of priority)

A. Viet Minh Developments

Although US intelligence obtains considerable intelligence from its own and French sources on the military, economic, and political situation in the Viet Minh, the quality of such intelligence is generally too low to support firm or conclusive estimates. This may be an insoluble problem because of the great difficulties involved in the collection process. Where at all possible, however, US estimates would profit from the following:

1. More reliable intelligence concerning the Viet Minh manpower situation.
2. More reliable intelligence concerning the state of morale among the Viet Minh leadership and Army, and among the population within Viet Minh-controlled territory.
3. More reliable intelligence concerning the extent of consolidation of control over territories held by the Viet Minh; the political, economic, and police instruments of control; the extent to which the regime is welcome and supported; the degree of leadership.

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4. More reliable intelligence concerning the present role of Ho Chi-Minh; the other important figures in the Viet Minh (backgrounds, responsibilities, etc.).
5. More reliable intelligence concerning the frictions, if any, which exist between the Viet Minh and the Chinese Communists; the effect of traditional Chinese-Indochinese ill-feeling; the existence, if any, of Viet Minh "nationalist," as distinguished from "Communist," aspirations; the displacing, if any, of indigenous leadership and influence by Chinese pressure or personalities.
6. More reliable intelligence concerning the relations, if any, between the Viet Minh and the Soviets; the existence, if any, of frictions between Peiping and Moscow concerning superior influence over the Viet Minh.

B. Chinese Communist Developments

A situation somewhat similar to that discussed above exists as far as Chinese Communist support of the Viet Minh is concerned. There is here a greater quantity of reporting than there is on the Viet Minh itself, with US covert and French sources augmented by US, British, and Chinese Nationalist diplomatic reporting. Again,

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however, the reliability of this intelligence is for the most part poor, although reports on developments within China are generally superior to those concerning Viet Minh territories. Where at all possible, US estimates would profit from the following:

1. More reliable intelligence concerning Chinese Communist "advisors" with the Viet Minh; the number, training, status, function, and influence of these people.
2. More reliable intelligence concerning Chinese Communist "volunteers," if any, with the Viet Minh; the number, method of integration, command relationships, training, status, function, and influence of these people.
3. More reliable intelligence concerning Chinese Communist capabilities with respect to Indochina: OB, transportation improvements, stockpiling, and air force and naval developments; economic capabilities for more active participation in Indochina.
4. More reliable intelligence concerning indications of Chinese Communist intentions with respect to Indochina.

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C. French Developments

More reliable intelligence would be helpful concerning:

1. Indications of French intentions with respect to Indochina.
2. Reported exploratory negotiations for some kind of "settlement" between French and Viet Minh, Chinese, and/or Soviet officials; if such negotiations have actually taken place, the nature of them; if they have not, the source of the rumors of such negotiations.

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